A Dualistic Self At The Center of Experience

It seems we are at the center of experience as either the subject or the object. “I and me” become reference points for a very narrow view on  the world of perceived circumstance. Much attention and focus is placed on what”I” think about “that” and how “that” is effecting “me”.  It seems perception and meaning are intrinsically self-centered and thereby represent a narrow way of knowing.

The TSK vision takes the self out of the center of knowing. With knowledge as primary, instead of believing that the self is having various experiences, we can begin to consider the possibility that there are various experiences of a self. Experience becomes primary and self (as both subject and object) becomes content.

There is nothing to defend, maintain and perpetuate as self becomes content of mind.

Hayward

About Hayward

Clinical Psychologist and practicing psychotherapist for thirty seven years. Studying Time Space and Knowledge since 1980 and integrating this vision into clinical practice as seemingly appropriate and useful.
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1 Response to A Dualistic Self At The Center of Experience

  1. michaelg says:

    Hayward,
    Thank you for your especially clear exploration of how both the subjective ‘I’ and the objective ‘me” are aspects of a narrow way of knowing–since both the active ‘I’ and the passive ‘me’ are committed to ownership. After all, there’s not much difference between “I own that” and “that belongs to me”. And your suggestion to view both the subjective and objective polls from a wider perspective–by considering the experiences of the self as ‘content’–feels like a promising invitation to shift to that kind of wider perspective. Since the ‘content’ of an experience would seem incapable of owning that experience (as illuminated in your phrase “instead of believing that the self is HAVING various experiences . . .) it makes sense to consider that the experience is primary and that the self couldn’t arise without experience.

    Could it be that the self–like a fish swimming in the ocean–can’t see that it is contained in an experience without which it would have nowhere to be swimming?

    Even thought the claim of ownership is deeply embedded in my habits of thought, I find that–repeatedly seeing the relationship between self and experience in a new light–the light itself becomes more familiar.

    Perhaps one of these days, especially if I keep hanging out with you, something will click and the winds of a primary knowing–from which all particular instances of knowing arise–will be understood to be beyond the scope of ownership.

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